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It is sufficient to remark that the hyperbole lies, but not so as to 
intend to deceive by lying, and we therefore ought to consider 
more carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which is 
not believed. 
— Quintillian, Institutio Oratoria 
Hyperbole is used to garner public interest and support for science. 
This phenomenon has been investigated, showing that hedges and 
qualifiers can be dropped to emphasize certainty, shifting technical 
science from a forensic genre to an epideictic one as it moves from 
proving science in the technical sphere to celebrating it in the 
broader public (Fahnestock, 1986). Some scholars raise concerns 
that such exaggeration through simplification “may hinder the 
responsible and effective use of scientific evidence in decision 
making” or “risk losing public trust” in science by perpetuating the 
false image of science as “infallible monolith” and raising the ire of 
anti-science publics (Kueffer and Larson, 2014, 3; Nisbet, 2009, 53; 
Locke, 1999, 77).  
While science, in either its technical or public manifestation, is 
inescapably rhetorical, there remains a worry that some hyperbolic 
claims of science can unnecessarily alienate key audiences by 
perpetuating partisan visions of science. The “conflict frame,” for 
instance, encourages polarization between science and religion as 
propagated by supporters of evolutionary theory, such as Richard 
Dawkins, who draw on technical scientific conclusions not just to 
argue publicly that evolution explains origins, but to claim that it 
negates religious explanations too (Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009; 
Dawkins, 2009). This kind of claim, I argue, is not merely 
hyperbolic, as it does not simply add certainty to a technical claim 
by removing qualifiers and hedges. It is also paralogical in that it 
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illogically jumps from one line of reasoning to another. As we will 
learn from the case study of this article, citing technical science that 
makes an empirical case about a single fossil and then publicizing it 
as definitive evidence of the “missing link” is exaggerative and 
illogical. The technical sphere the claim is purported to have been 
drawn from does not recognize “missing links” as defensible claims 
about evolution. 
I will describe an array of discursive moves related to paralogic 
hyperbole that are commonly used by agents to rhetorically shape 
scientific claims that are not defensible within the technical sphere 
(“missing links,” for example) into claims that at least superficially 
might seem technically defensible to broader publics. My objects of 
analysis are a book, a website, and a television documentary all 
sharing the same title: The Link. The texts of The Link are 
popularization efforts based on a controversial scientific report 
published in the all-online peer-reviewed journal of the Public 
Library of Science, PLOS ONE.  
Written by a team of accomplished paleontologists and 
geologists from Germany, Sweden, Norway, and the United States, 
the PLOS ONE article describes the fossilized skeleton of a forty-
seven million year old creature, Darwinius Marsillae. The article 
makes claims about Darwinius Marsillae as being a lemur fossil 
that could possibly have broader implications for understanding 
primate lineage. The popularization texts of The Link exaggerate 
the conclusions of the original PLOS ONE article in ways that 
hardly resemble claims actually defensible in the technical sphere 
by arguing that the skeleton is a “missing link,” as opposed to a 
“transitional fossil.” From the analysis of the case of Darwinius 
Marsillae, we learn that the paralogical hyperbole in the texts of 
The Link actually gave members of scientifically oppositional 
publics inventional resources for building an anticategoria, a retort 
that turns an interlocutor’s claim back on him or her,  pointing to 
evolutionary science (in both technical and public forums) as 
“confused.” How, we may ask, should critics respond to paralogical 
hyperbole? Dissoi logoi, the ancient practice of visiting the “other 
words” on an issue, and prolepsis, answering the qualms of 
oppositional audiences in our arguments, present useful tools for 
practicing critical reception and response to paralogical hyperbole, 
both on the part of members of the technical sphere and the 
broader public. Some background information will be given on the 
case of Darwinius Marsillae and defensible claims regarding 
representations of transitional species in the technical spheres of 
paleobiology.  
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DARWINIUS’ STORY: FROM QUARRY TO 
QUARREL, FROM THE PAGES OF PLOS ONE TO 
THE LINK  
Darwinius in the Pages of PLOS ONE 
Darwinius Marsillae, a small lemur-like skeleton, was found in 
1983 at Messel Pit, an abandoned quarry in Germany known for its 
rich fossil deposits, and spent over 20 years in storage before being 
sold to the Natural History Museum of Oslo in 2007. Norwegian 
vertebrate paleontologist Jørn Hurum facilitated sale of the fossil 
after being contacted by an anonymous source wishing to sell the 
skeleton; the identity of its original discoverer is still unknown 
(Schons, 2011). After the skeleton was secured by the museum, it 
was examined from 2007–2009 by six scientists, including Hurum, 
who all specialized roughly in the area of paleobiology (“University 
of Oslo,” 2012). The results of this examination were published in 
the online journal PLOS ONE.1  
The article is entitled Complete Primate Skeleton from the 
Middle Eocene of Messel in Germany: Morphology and 
1 The scientific journal in which Darwinius is first described, PLOS 
ONE, is a dedicated “online” publication that possesses some traits that 
distinguish it from more traditional “print” journal articles. For instance, 
attached to the article is an icon that leads to readers’ “Comments.” The 
majority of the comments consist of technical questions (and answers) 
about the specific methods (Keesey, 2009; Coblo, 2009; Bsn8, 2009) and 
materials (Rpmias, 2009) employed in the authors’ examination of 
Darwinius. What is interesting about these comments is that they are 
from individuals who seem to have some technical knowledge, using 
words like, “plesiomorphies” (Keesey, 2009) or “Keratin mass 
spectrometry” (BramSnijders, 2009). In addition to these types of 
technical procedural comments, there are a few concerned with the “up 
selling” of the skeleton in the other venues (i.e., their book, website, and 
film). The construction of new media space that facilitates this kind of 
dialogue between the agents within a technical sphere and “outsiders” 
from the general public presents what has been said to represent the 
“courage to sit” in public discussions of science, as it does not “rashly” 
allow non-experts to engage in technical deliberations, but also avoids the 
cowardice of shutting out those who might question the motives of doing 
the science in the first place (Coleman, 2015a). While PLOS ONE does 
present an interesting site of publication, the current study is less 
concerned with the spaces created by publications, or the publication 
procedures of those spaces, and much more concerned with how 
individuals can more responsibly represent their projects in the public 
forum broadly, as they source, interpret, and employ findings from the 
technical sphere. 
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Paleobiology (Franzen et al., 2009). In it, Darwinius Marsillae is 
described as “the most complete primate known in the fossil 
record” and as evidence of a new species (Darwinius Marsillae) 
that “call[s] into question accepted wisdom about the origin of 
higher primates” (Franzen et al., 2009, 1–2). Pointing to specific 
phylogenic qualities, the authors posit that Darwinius possesses 
characteristics of both lemurs and apes (Franzen et al., 2009, 19). 
Some of the specific characteristics that are pointed out are that 
Darwinius’ skeleton is shaped like a member of the strepsirrhine or 
“lemur” line but lacks the “tooth comb” and “grooming claw” 
commonly associated with the line; it possesses opposable thumbs, 
fingertips with nails, and an anklebone similar to primates that 
should be categorized in the haplorrhine or “ape” line. Thus, based 
on the idiosyncrasies of the skeleton’s phenotype, the authors argue 
that Darwinius “could represent a stem group from which later 
anthropoid [human-like] primates evolved, but we are not 
advocating this here” (Franzen et al., 2009, 24, italics added).  
Paralogical Hyperbole in The Link 
While the claims in the technical PLOS ONE article are relatively 
restrained, the subsequent book, website, and History Channel 
program—all entitled The Link— whose authors would later cite 
Darwinius, exaggerate not just the significance of the skeleton, but 
also its implications regarding explanations of origins. Specifically, 
in all permutations of The Link, the original PLOS ONE study is 
cited as describing “the missing link” of humanity’s primate 
lineage—“the” final piece of evidence needed for evolutionists to 
link human existence to the animals (see “The Link,” 2009a; 
2009b).2 What is significant about the exaggeration of The Link is 
                                                    
2 This work will perform a rhetorical analysis of paralogical hyperbole, 
as it occurs between the technical and public spheres in discussions of the 
Darwinius Marsillae discovery. In examining both a scientific article and 
its transformation for public audiences, this work follows the path of 
Jeanne Fahnestock, who studies how scientific knowledge moves from 
technical publics into more popular ones (Fahnestock, 1986). But where 
Fahnestock started with original scientific facts and traced the shifts in 
genre (i.e., forensic to epideictic) and qualifiers (i.e., caveats were 
removed to create more absolute language) as they moved from technical 
spheres to popular spheres, this study will instead begin with the 
“popularized” versions of the Darwinius manuscript and the audiences 
for whom the versions were crafted to appeal. Furthermore, this study is 
less concerned with how scientific facts rhetorically shift as they move 
from the technical sphere to the popular and even more with why those 
shifts are important to specific audiences. Zeroing in on the elements of a 
primary text that earned paralogical exaggeration can help to isolate what 
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not that it is an overstatement of the conclusions made in the 
original article—many scientific articles are exaggerated when 
publicized by way of reducing qualifiers and playing up 
significance.3  The distinctive thing about the exaggeration of The 
Link is that it does not just play up significance or drop a qualifier— 
making dry science exciting by exaggerating a claim in line with the 
trajectory of the original claims of the article. Rather, it attempts to 
make a claim that is itself cripplingly indefensible with regard to 
scientific consensus.  
Michael Shermer, a popular science writer for Scientific 
American, explains the problem with our current exaggeration 
quite clearly in what he describes as the “fossil fallacy”: “the belief 
that a ‘single fossil’—one bit of data—constitutes proof of a 
multifarious process or historical sequence” (Shermer, 2005, 1). 
With respect to the skeleton of Darwinius, it would be erroneous 
reasoning to point to a singular piece of evidence (i.e., a “missing 
link”) to explain something as multivariate and complex as hominid 
evolution. To do so would be to make claims about human origins 
with only a single empirical data point. Thus, the claim is 
paralogical (“illogical”) in that it embellishes the claim, which is 
what hyperbole is supposed to do, but does so by diverging 
drastically with the original technical line of reasoning it purports 
to be embellishing. In paralogical hyperbole, an argument does not 
just get ahead of itself; it jumps to making conclusions for a 
completely different claim. Douglas Walton clarifies:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
aspects of the original text have proven to be most problematic or facile 
for various audiences attempting to “make sense” of that text’s 
conclusions, given their respective belief-structures. Recognizing those 
key elements will show us glimpses of the values that constitute, drive, 
and steer evaluations of scientific validity or significance made by various 
publics that interact with the text. Paralogical hyperbole can be viewed 
not only as a slippage of qualifier on the part of a rhetor, but also as a tool 
for rhetoricians interested in understanding the values behind those 
slippages. 
3 Fahnestock describes many examples of publicizers of science 
“add[ing] to the significance of the subject by claiming its uniqueness, its 
one-of-a-kind status”—hyperbole, absolutely, but hyperbole that 
exaggerates in directions that logically move from the original claims 
made in the technical journal articles they are based on. Even in her 
example of a Science piece describing “vulture bees,” wherein the specific 
diet of the bees is described, but later popularized as “bees ‘that can eat 
any animal’” to “glamorize the danger of bees,” it is an example of a 
potentially problematic simplification, but one that does not necessarily 
jump to a new line of argument as it is still describing the bee’s diet, only 
in a more dramatic way (Fahnestock, 1986, 281). 
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Paralogisms are errors of reasoning that relate to logical 
forms of inference. These forms can be deductive or 
inductive forms of argument like modus ponens or 
arguing from a sample to a larger population. Or they 
can be argumentation schemes for presumptive 
reasoning. Paralogisms are fallacies that arise chiefly 
through failure of an argument to meet a set burden of 
proof (Walton, 1995, 257, emphasis his).   
Moreover, paralogisms involve inferences that do not follow from 
the premises of an argument but nonetheless seem appropriate to 
some audiences. Important to note, paralogisms are a type of 
fallacy offset from sophisms, in that paralogisms usually denote 
fallacies of which the arguer is unaware, whereas sophisms denote 
more consciously fallacious deceptions. So a paralogic hyperbole is 
a claim that fallaciously “jumps” arguments in ways that seem 
unknown to the arguer him or herself as claims move from the 
technical sphere to the public and the slippages of technical 
defensibility blur into one another, making them less visible to a 
rhetor or to his or her audience(s). 
Paralogical hyperbole is inevitable, exciting, appeasing, and 
satiating. Given that much public communication of science, 
especially via media like that of the History Channel, is 
economically driven, it would be naïve to expect that such actors 
would be bothered to “clean up” their communication at the 
expense of “giving the people what they want.” So, paralogical 
hyperbole is presented here chiefly as a trope to be aware of as we 
receive public communications of science more than as informing 
the production of science communication per se. Moreover, 
paralogical hyperbole simply works for some audiences; it is 
important not to overlook this reality en route to explaining some 
of the problems with the trope. 
The Problem of Paralogical Hyperbole in The Link 
In the case of the popularizations of the PLOS ONE article, the 
authors of The Link tried to take the discourse of the original article 
and forward it as the “missing link.”  The idea of a “missing link” 
actually plays into the classical idea (later folded in with 
Christianity) that envisions a Great Chain of Being from the lower 
animals to the highest. To find the “missing link” is to demonstrate 
humanity’s relationship with the rest of nature by filling in and 
completing the chain. Pointing to a fossil as a “missing link” would 
be a gaffe, at least with regard to technically defensible versions of 
evolution, where species are the products of chance and natural 
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selection instead of design, representing more of a “flattened” web 
between species than a hierarchical top-down chain. Thus to make 
reference to the “missing link” is to move forward from a vision of 
evolution that sneaks into it a set of cosmological implications that 
so happen to be expressly relevant to creationist explanations of 
origins. That is, if the “missing link” is found the “gaps” between 
chain links are made “complete,” demonstrating humanity’s 
relation to the rest of nature. If the “missing link” is found, humans 
can no longer enjoy their distinct place at the top of the Chain of 
Being, touching fingertips with the angels, for if all species, 
including humans, are related, humanity is not special. In 
paleobiology, the preferred term is “transitional fossil” instead of 
missing link to avoid just this implication. The term is consciously 
used in technical spheres of paleobiology instead of “missing link” 
in order to represent fossils that might have characteristics of an 
ancestral line and a more recent line of species, but one that is most 
emphatically non-hierarchical, reducing its relevance to any 
testimony biology might give about theistic conceptions of origins 
(Prothero, 2008). An argument field with proclivity for the term 
“transitional fossil” is one in which “initiated” interlocutors do not 
speak of single fossils as representative of evidence for cosmological 
claims. In all of The Link’s popularization efforts of the PLOS ONE 
article, by contrast, Darwinius Marsillae acquires a new name—
“Ida,”and she is exaggerated into the public sphere as the “missing 
link.” Borrowing from the ethos of technical paleobiology The Link 
forwards a claim that disregards a major assumption that composes 
the foundation of that ethos in the first place (Handwerk, 2009).   
To make matters worse, amidst the clamor of Darwinius as “a 
missing link” members of the technical sphere began calling into 
question the claims of the original PLOS ONE technical journal 
article. Pointing to a poor analysis of phylogeny on the part of the 
scientists (regarding inferences to and implications of anthropoid—
“higher primate”— characteristics, specifically), critics, mostly 
fellow scientists, argued that it is unlikely that Darwinius is 
representative of a transitional species with any implications for 
anthropoid lines at all (e.g., Beard, 2009). We will see that these 
public critiques of The Link’s paralogical exaggeration were 
exploited by some oppositional publics to build an anticategoria 
against evolutionary science. 
As shown by Leah Ceccarelli, the ways in which scientists stand 
for the projects they favor in the public sphere requires rhetorical 
prowess in order to avoid the pitfalls of our 21st century public 
sphere (Ceccarelli, 2011). As she demonstrates in her telling work 
on “manufactured controversies” in public science, scientists who 
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“write off” scientifically oppositional viewpoints because these 
viewpoints do not actually exist in the technical consensus of 
science can hurt public sympathies with science; such a move goes 
against appeals to balance and inclusion endemic in a broader 
democratic public sphere. This paper carries out a similar critique, 
as it will focus on the ways in which scientists step out from the 
technical sphere to stand for the projects they favor in the public 
sphere. Instead of focusing on how advocates can defend science 
from scientifically-opposed publics, this paper will focus on how we 
can defend science from those who think they are doing good by 
science, but are instead propagating paralogic hyperbole.  
HYPERBOLE: FROM SCIENTIFIC FACT TO 
PARALOGICAL ACT  
Hyperbole, as defined in Rhetorica ad Herennium, “is the manner 
of speech exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of 
magnifying or minifying something”, which can occur through 
exaggerative metaphor and simile, the enumeratio-esque piling of 
extravagantly evocative diction, and the comparison of particular 
objects (Caplan, 1964, 4.33.44; Aristotle, 2007, 225–226; 
Fahnestock, 2011, 118; Quintillian, 2006, 339).  
Traditionally, hyperbole is discussed most rigorously with 
regard to rhetorics that have aesthetic or political ends (see 
Claridge, 216–219; Jasinski, 2001, 549–550; Patnoe, 1996, 334–
335). But hyperbole, considered as a rhetorical figure, can also be 
used for epistemic ends by amplifying the characteristics of a given 
phenomenon. That is, hyperbole can be used to “play-up” the 
scientific-ness of a something so as to “demarcate” it from things 
merely pseudoscientific (Taylor, 1996). In the current case, 
paralogical hyperbole is the result of attempts by agents to borrow 
the ethos of the technical sphere to add gravity to their claims. But 
those claims, it turns out, are not defensible within the sphere from 
which they are borrowing their ethos. That is, paralogical hyperbole 
can borrow from the “foundations” of technical arguments, which 
are based in a “person’s identification with his [or her] work in a 
special occupation”—such as that of a scientist—but makes claims 
that do not represent those foundations at all (Goodnight, 1999, 
253). As will be demonstrated later, the result is something that 
that looks pseudoscientific, is not persuasive to oppositional 
publics, and even threatens to leech back to the original technical 
sphere from which one is appropriating scientific “facts,” thereby 
muddying what technically defensible science actually looks like.  
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Further, paralogical hyperbole can be perceived by uncritical 
publics and rhetors not as exaggeration, but as “fact.” Jeanne 
Fahnestock describes such uses of hyperbole not as “knowingly 
ironic,” or as “an attempt to amplify,” but rather as “exaggerated 
language [that] is meant ‘as is,’ to hit an appropriate level of 
characterization” (Fahnestock, 2011, 117).4 As it is being described 
in the current study, paralogical hyperbole exists in claims that fail 
to demonstrate a conscious differentiation between exaggerations 
of findings of the technical sphere, like those that avoid fossil 
fallacy arguments, and illogical exaggerations of those findings, 
such as those that point to a single skeleton as a “missing link.” 
They are conflated to be one in the same. Accordingly, paralogic 
hyperbole seems to be problematic for two reasons: (1) It can be 
                                                    
4 Scientific validity, or the perceived accuracy of the methods used to 
derive knowledge about a given phenomenon, is assessed within 
ideologically and epistemologically situated frameworks. For instance, 
some believe that human psychology is nothing more than the 
electrochemical composition of the brain and body. Within this 
worldview, it would be valid to engage research that attempts to 
understand human psychology by identifying, measuring, and testing the 
chemicals and electric currents in human bodies (Thomas, 1999). People 
who believe this way are often categorized as “materialist-reductionists.” 
On the other side of the metaphysical coin, there is another group of 
people, the “emergentists,” who believe that no matter how much one 
learns about the electrochemical composition of the human body, there 
will always be something that exists just out of reach of the instruments 
one uses to measure the material world. Within the scope of this 
worldview, it would not be valid to refer solely to the chemical and 
electrical compositions of the human body to understand human 
psychology, simply because to this group, there is more to the equation 
than chemicals and electricity. These differences in what counts as 
scientifically valid will influence what emergentists and material-
reductionists will choose to “play-up” about a given psychological finding, 
so as to deflect and avoid discordant views of scientific truth. It is 
somewhat of an axiom within persuasion research that people prefer 
“cognitive consistency” to “inconsistency” (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008, 78). 
So, it would not be much of a stretch to argue that when psychological 
findings are interpreted and repeated by emergentists and material-
reductionists, they tend to be exaggerated in directions that correspond 
with their extant worldviews in order to avoid the inherent dissonance 
involved with the “self-discrepancies” produced by clashing beliefs 
(Festinger, 1957; Higgins, 1987). Similarly the “significance,” or the 
weightiness of findings, would be expected to pass through a similar 
process of belief-relevant interpretation and exaggeration; thus, 
paralogical jumps, to some, can represent “as is” hyperbole, allowing 
room for interlocutors to “overshoot the range of cases their theories 
cover” based on the “values dear to them” (Depew, 2013, 381). 
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unnecessarily and uselessly polarizing; and (2) knowledge making 
generally might suffer from the imprecise and uncritical use of 
scientific findings associated with paralogical exaggeration. In the 
following section will be an analysis of the paralogical exaggeration 
of Darwinius Marsillae in the book, the website, and the television 
program The Link, wherein the transitional species, Darwinius 
Marsillae, is rhetorically shaped into “Ida,” the “missing link.” 
Later, dissoi logoi and prolepsis will be discussed as instrumentally 
useful and ethical means for critically engaging paralogical 
hypberbole. 
DARWINIUS HYPERBOLICUS: RENDERING A 
COMPLETE PRIMATE SKELETON TO THE LINK 
The Link, as it appears in transmediated form, spanning a book, a 
film, and a website, cites the original PLOS ONE article to tell the 
tale of Darwinius Marsillae. On The Link’s webpage, Darwinius is 
described as having “some early anthropoid traits. These 
foreshadow physical features which later appear in monkeys, apes, 
and of course, humans” (“The Link,” 2009b, italics added). With its 
fairly obvious usage of a synonym for “naturally,” or “matter of 
fact,” this claim is stating that of course the Ida skeleton 
foreshadows the features that show up later in humans. This shows 
a commitment to a progressivist evolutionary narrative, but not 
necessarily one connected to scientific consensus. For instance, 
using incrementum evolution is depicted in a step-by-step increase 
in complexity that culminates with modern humans, starting with 
Darwinius. It is a portrayal that resonates with a “missing link” 
narrative, but not necessarily one of a transitional species.5  The 
claim is that progressive evolution is valid. The evidence is the 
Darwinius skeleton. The warrant necessary for this claim to yield 
acceptance is one built on prior commitments to demonstrating 
humanity’s linkage to nature. In the technical sphere of 
paleobiology, such a warrant exists, but only in a highly qualified 
form. Just as foreshadowing a plot helps orient the reader to 
understand later narrative points, Darwinius is placed as the 
necessary antecedent to understanding later developments of 
monkeys, apes, and humans. The story is made complete. In this 
5 An incredibly similar use of incrementum is described by Lessl in his 
analysis of a display of humanoid skulls at the Musée de l’Homme, which 
resounding the conclusions of Fahnestock’s writing on the device, 
culminates with the sense of climax that makes incrementum a distinct 
device of series reasoning by displaying a recent homo sapien skull last—
the epitome of humanity’s evolutionary track culminated (Lessl, 2012; 
Fahnestock, 1996; see also, Fahnestock, 2014).  
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logical frame, the nebulous, complex, ever-expanding process of 
evolutionary speciation that created modern humans is broken 
down into four simple plot points. It is a claim about paleobiology, 
exaggerated toward cosmological claims, and in a way paralogical, 
given the sphere from whence it was germinated, in which these 
warrants do not exist. 
In fact, the warrant unlocking such a paralogical jump between 
technical and public spheres is wrapped up with what Lessl would 
describe as a larger kind of spiritual commitment: “evolutionism” 
(Lessl, 2012). To Lessl, evolutionism is a mythologized “narrative 
about an ‘evolving’ human ‘destiny’—the species’ destined reunion 
with the cosmos that is being accomplished through science” (Lessl, 
2012, 12). In this sense, the above narrative of The Link could be 
legitimated into a reasonable story by the values of evolutionism, 
values that place scientific practices aimed at showing humanity’s 
link with nature as more respectable than those that do not.  
Such paralogical hyperboles are sometimes covered by 
authority. Sir David Attenborough, a famous broadcaster and 
“naturalist,” illustrates another example of paralogical exaggeration 
regarding the significance of Darwinius in a video quote posted to 
The Link website under the heading, “The Implications:”  
It’s a discovery of great significance. We desperately 
want to know where we came from…it’s not a question of 
deduction, not a question of imagination, not a question 
of suggestions, it’s fact….The link, they [creationists] 
would have said, until now is missing. Well, it is no 
longer missing (“The Implications,” 2009, 0:02–0:59, 
italics added). 
Attenborough exaggerates the implications of Darwinius from a 
paleobiological fossil that has characteristics which, according to 
the original PLOS ONE article, “could represent a stem group from 
which later anthropoid [human-like] primates evolved” (italics 
added, 24). The explanatory power of the skeleton is exaggerated in 
Attenborough’s depiction. The amplification of this explanatory 
power is bolstered by Attenborough’s enumeratio, which lists off 
descriptors of the discovery, recounting the skeleton as an object 
that does not present questions of “deduction” or “imagination” or 
“suggestion”—epistemic states that are commonly considered 
subject to human error. Instead, it is a “fact.” Enumeratio 
legitimates the paralogical exaggeration of the PLOS ONE article by 
reducing space for the infiltration of human inaccuracy. After all, 
facts are not open to interpretation. And if they are not open to 
interpretation they cannot be exaggerated. Thus the “missing link” 
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is a fact, and because of the narrative that it completes it is a fact 
that negates creationism. Science—specifically objective science—
actualizes humanity’s destiny to reunite with nature. 
Attenborough’s exaggerated view reverberates in the epilogue of 
the book The Link. It paints a picture of “many a philosopher and 
cleric” as wrongheaded for having “condemned biologists for 
daring to emphasize our affinity with other creatures,” but then 
goes on to say,  
but many a philosopher and cleric, and of course many a 
biologist, have not been ashamed to be associated with 
the other beasts. St. Francis of Assisi, felt by many to be 
the most Christlike of the Christian saints declared that 
the animals and plants were his brothers and sisters….If 
everything is God’s Creation, why would we want to be 
aloof from it? Who are we to be so superior? (Tudge, 
2009, 245, italics added).  
Collin Tudge, the author of the book version of The Link, seems to 
exhibit less paralogical exaggeration than Attenborough in the 
video version, as his claims can operate without necessarily relying 
on a “missing link” warrant. His is an exaggeration of the 
significance of the Darwinius skeleton in which the non-
hierarchical structures of speciation exists. The warrant for a 
“transitional fossil” argument exists independently of the spiritual 
commitments to nature that characterize the evolutionist narrative 
in Lessl’s sense. Additionally, instead of stressing the fact that 
humans are not “superior” to the “other beasts” as a claim that 
denies creationism, Tudge seems he would rather pose the idea as a 
synchoresis—or “conceding one point for the sake of another”—
wherein perhaps both religion and science can coexist within an 
evolutionary narrative (Burton, 2007a). Nonetheless, the inclusion 
of such appeals to spirituality give the argument a wildly different 
character from that of technically defensible arguments about 
evolution as they take on implications that go beyond the empirical.  
The Harms of Paralogical Hyperbole to Public 
Understandings and Dialogue of Science 
Reception evidence of The Link reveals the invisibility of its 
exaggerations to audiences already committed to an evolutionist 
narrative. Take for instance, the following comment countering the 
Creationist project on a YouTube page created to discuss 
Attenborough’s views on the Ida skeleton:   
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Wow Creationists are so foolish. It's them that keep 
asking after every gap in the human evolution fossil 
record and every time we find exactly what evolution 
predict they ask for another. Want to know why we keep 
finding missing links? It's because that's what 
creationists want. Unfortunately for them this is the last 
Gap we had to fill. Though it has been over-hyped [sic] 
(Since we already have irrefutable evidence and this 
doesn't actually add much) by the media (OlympicRudi, 
2009). 
Despite the fact that this audience member acknowledges that 
Darwinius may have been “over-hyped,” the evolutionist narrative 
of The Link remains intact. Darwinius still remains to be the “last 
Gap we had to fill” in order to complete the story of evolutionism. 
So, while there may be some aspect of the skeleton that has been 
“over-hyped,” this audience member does not see an exaggeration 
of claims of Darwinius (a single fossil) completing and affirming 
the narrative of evolutionism, as something that has been 
exaggerated—it is a fact. This is an exquisite example of the 
potential harms of paralogical exaggeration. Because this audience 
member’s valuative schema is already so resonant with the claims 
being made in The Link the over extrapolation of the skeleton’s 
significance is treated as largely invisible, even alongside an 
attempt to point to the campaign itself as hyperbolic. The fossil 
fallacy is perpetuated unchecked, distorting what is actually 
scientifically defensible within the technical sphere. In addition to 
this, and as noted in the introduction, one of the main worries 
about such an outcome is that it might perpetuate partisanship 
among publics of science.   
Some creationists found the words of The Link to be claims not 
of fact, but exaggerated treatments of fact: “It may seem incredible 
that anyone would hail this find as a ‘missing link.’….Unbelievably, 
Attenborough claims his interpretation is ‘not a question of 
imagination” (“Got Questions Ministries,” 2012). Here the 
incompatibility of the competing narrative logics of creationism and 
evolutionism can be found as they intersect at the Darwinius 
skeleton. As discussed above, in the logic of The Link, Darwinius is 
the missing link, the final preface needed to understand the lineage 
of speciation—the plot, which started with Darwinius, moving 
through monkeys and on to apes and humans. The moral of the 
evolutionist narrative, forwarded by the causal relations between 
these characters, is that humanity is not above, or distinct from 
nature, but rather is nature, born of a very long, interconnected 
lineage of ancestors. This interconnectivity is oppositional to the 
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creationist narrative, which posits that species were created 
specially and distinctly by a Creator: “The fossil [Darwinius] does 
not resemble a human skeleton….it was a small, tailed, probably 
tree-climbing, and now extinct primate—from a kind created on 
Day 6 of Creation week” (“Answersingenesis,” 2009). While 
Creationists give the impression that the fossil does exist as 
evidence for something, that thing is not human evolution because 
in the Creationist narrative logic, species exist not as 
interconnected ancestors, but as disconnected creations.   
In the creationist sense-making narrative, species were made 
independently and perfectly by God on days five and six of 
“Creation week.”6 Every species, then, is disconnected from, and 
unrelated to, every other species, including Homo sapiens. The 
moral of the creationist story, advanced by removing causal 
relations between species, is that humanity has not been born of 
nature, but rather by the hands of a Creator. Therefore, in this logic, 
Darwinius can certainly be evidence of a now extinct instance of 
God’s creation. It cannot, however, describe any sort of 
interconnected relationship to monkeys, or apes, or humans 
because there is no warrant—as in evolutionist narrative—that 
allows such relationships. The above responses imply a perception 
of The Link’s claims about Darwinius not as fact, or even as 
legitimate science, but as hyperbolic poppycock, the product of 
uncritical evolutionist dogma. This response reveals the apparent 
futility of arguing against creationists with claims that rely on either 
“missing link” or “transitional fossil” type warrants. However, it 
seems that “transitional fossil” type arguments avoid direct 
refutations of religion. So although both “transitional fossil” and 
“missing link” type arguments both rely on the notion that 
humanity is linked to the animals—a fundamental difference from 
the creationist argument field—transitional fossil arguments seem 
to sidestep needlessly placing claims within the realm of religion; 
they restrict themselves to empirical claims about a single fossil. As 
we will see in the next section, despite the differences in 
defensibility of claim, The Link, and its public refuters, who mostly 
represent paleobiology, which consciously attempts to stay away 
from cosmological/spiritual claims, they were treated as one in the 
same by creationist publics.  Consequently, a straw man argument 
was created by those attempting to critique The Link by charging 
6 It is important to note that there is a wide spectrum of beliefs that 
are amenable to blending elements of the evolutionist and creationist 
narratives, in what one might call “intelligent design.” For the sake of 
argument and clarity the current study will focus on radical creationists 
who believe in a literal reading of Genesis.  
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them with sharing the same foundational argument field that 
spawned the arguments they were refuting in the first place.  
PARALOGICAL HYPERBOLE AS 
ANTICATEGORIA  
 Anticategoria is defined by Burton as “a retort in which one turns 
the very accusation made by one’s adversary back against him” 
(Burton, 2007b, 1). In The Link, the accusation being made is that 
the creationist narrative is false because humanity is in fact 
interconnected with nature, for “the link” in the evolutionist story 
“is no longer missing” (“The Implications,” 2009, 0:45–0:59). To 
invert this accusation, creationists pointed to individuals from the 
technical sphere, such as Chris Beard, the curator of vertebrate 
paleontology at the Carnegie Museum of Natural History, who 
commented on the original PLOS ONE article, calling the 
description of Darwinius faulty science (Thomas and Sherwin, 
2009; Beard, 2009). In Beard’s view, while Darwinius might have 
primate characteristics that help us to think about evolutionary 
processes “this does not necessarily make Ida [Darwinius] a close 
relative of anthropoids” (Beard, 2009, 1). To argue this would 
require Darwinius “to have anthropoid-like features that evolved 
after anthropoids split away from lemurs and other early primates. 
Here, alas, Ida fails miserably” (Beard, 2009, 1). In light of the 
revelation of the flaws in the original PLOS ONE article some 
creationists exploited this opportunity to show that the public 
popularization of Darwinius was wildly different from defensible 
claims about transitional species in the technical sphere (Batten, 
2009). To do so, they pointed explicitly to Beard’s public 
commentary as well as to the fact that his views also resounded in 
the halls of the biological academy at large (see Dalton, 2009 for an 
example of the Darwinius controversy within the academy). By 
referencing the inconsistency between the scientific consensus 
concerning claims that could be made about Darwinius in the 
technical sphere and the claims made in the book, website, and 
television program of The Link in the grander public sphere, 
creationists were able to point to the bickering betwixt a rogue 
group of paleobiolgists committing paralogic hyperbole by arguing 
for a “missing link” and a group of concerned evolutionary 
scientists who attempted to hold them accountable to the technical 
argument field from which they were purportedly borrowing. From 
these public discourses, and the discrepancies between them, some 
creationists were able to build an anticategoria that described the 
entire project of evolution (both in the public and in the technical 
spheres) as inconsistent, confused, and false:  
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Ida’s accolades as the long-sought-after “missing link” 
are thoroughly undeserved. Both creation and 
evolutionary scientists recognize the reality that Ida does 
not reflect the claims of the publicity campaign. The 
extravagant marketing of the latest fossil purporting to 
be “proof of evolution” seems to have been timed for the 
effective sale of the evolutionary theory itself…One 
reason that published opinions on the subject are 
consistently inconsistent could be that all the 
evolutionary researchers involved are laboring under a 
false paradigm (Thomas and Sherwin, 2009, 1). 
These claims fail to distinguish the paralogical hyperbole of The 
Link from technically defensible evolutionary theory. Moreover, 
evolutionary theory is conflated with the spiritual commitments of 
a progressivist evolutionary narrative and worldview. Thus the 
anticategoria is wagered against all of evolutionary theory, not just 
those representing the evolutionist narrative. The scientists 
critiquing The Link had a claim turned back on them that they 
never actually made. The result was an anticategoria that did not 
distinguish between popular science or technical science, but rather 
just referred to “science.” With the recognition of paralogical 
hyperbole, the straw man involved in such a charge is rendered 
visible. 
In light of the findings in science communication literature that 
support for science and technology can be mediated by strength of 
religious beliefs, perhaps we would be served well by looking out for 
paralogical hyperbole that conflates technical claims with spiritual 
commitments (Brossard, Scheufele, Kim, and Lewenstein, 2008). 
And given the means by which this particular anticategoria was 
created perhaps we should even tread carefully when attempting to 
“call out” other scientists for unnecessarily taking on religious 
beliefs while trying to borrow the ethos of the technical sphere. In 
the US, over 30% of the population believes in a creationist 
explanation of human origins and nearly that many (29%) believe 
that scientists do not agree with one another about evolution (Funk 
and Rainie, 2015). Under these circumstances, there seem to be 
good reasons to search for tools to combat and correct paralogic 
hyperbole in public arguments about evolutionary science without 
unnecessarily perpetuating partisanship between scientific and 
religious commitments.   
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CHECKING PARALOGICAL HYPERBOLE WITH 
DISSOI LOGOI AND PROLEPSIS  
The act of identifying and treating the multiple perspectives that 
bear on an issue through dissoi logoi, the “other words,” is surely 
important to informing and strengthening one’s argument. Some 
might even argue, as I have elsewhere, that to do so is to perform an 
ethical duty to the fellow persons with whom one might disagree 
(Coleman, 2015b). Importantly, as the case we are dissecting 
reveals, it is important for individuals to be aware that multiple 
sense-making frameworks can exist for a single issue. As Nathan 
Crick puts it, “dissoi logoi” is not simply a statement that people 
disagree; rather, dissoi logoi emphasizes that productive action 
must be preceded by thoughtful debate that draws on the wealth of 
available knowledge to produce desirable results” (Crick, 2010, 36, 
his emphasis). Instrumentally speaking, visiting potentially 
oppositional audiences (including the technical spheres from which 
one is borrowing) provides audiences with the means by which to 
check for ethos. If we are amenable to and can entertain multiple 
argument fields as they bear on a single issue the paralogical jumps 
of reasoning that might exist between them are easier to see. In 
turn, one’s virtues of “decision making” and “good thinking” are 
enhanced when multiple perspectives are acknowledged, 
respectfully treated, and understood in one’s assessments.  
On the part of those who wish to publicly rebuke science 
communicators, Michael Leff and Jean Goodwin provide a useful 
discussion and revival of the term prolepsis, or anticipatory finding, 
and answering in one’s messages the potential counterarguments 
that exist in the minds of one’s opposition (Leff and Goodwin, 
2000). Where dissoi logoi is a tool for thinking about the invention 
of one’s arguments against paralogical hyperbole, prolepsis is a 
stylistic device for the presentation of those arguments. Leff and 
Goodwin argue that prolepsis helps to construct a “dialectical tier in 
an otherwise monologic discourse” (Leff and Goodwin, 2000, 68). 
This is to say that when one engages in prolepsis one is performing 
a dialogue with one’s oppositional audiences, be they technical or 
public. In doing so one distinguishes him or herself from other 
points of view, for example, those in whom one perceives 
paralogical exaggeration. Instead of just arguing, “science X is 
false!” one might argue instead, “science X has been presented in a 
way that is not defensible in the sphere from which it is purported 
to have been borrowed. And that original article is flawed anyhow.” 
This way the mousetrap presented by the inconsistency between 
evolutionary “scientists” can be headed off by showing that “science 
X” is not technical science, but instead the public version of that 
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science, not hard won through debate and consensus, but rather the 
interpretation of one or a few individuals attempting to stand for 
their own beliefs. They may be arguing for a version of evolution, 
but they are not arguing for or in the name of all of evolutionary 
science. Acknowledging that there is not merely one opposition, but 
potentially multiple oppositions is key to this prolepsis.  
Hyperbole might present itself as a necessity to help 
popularizations of science cut through our “overloaded” 
information age. But successfully navigating toward versions of 
“information quality” that recognize the need for “optimization” 
(simplifying by dropping qualifiers and hedges) without completely 
negating “soundness” is ideal (Eppler, 2015, 224). While we cannot 
expect for-profit organizations to cut the sensationalism, 
controversy, and group identity associated with paralogical 
hyperbole, we can attempt to cultivate critical sensibilities of it. 
Seeking out multiple perspectives and practicing awareness of those 
multiple perspectives can help add clarity and consistency to a 
sometimes “confused” ethos for science. Scientists can stand for the 
implications of science they favor in the public forum, even if they 
are claims not defensible in the technical sphere. But when they do 
it is vital that they keep in mind that even if they possess the correct 
science the manner in which they express that correctness can 
backfire on them. Letting science “speak for itself,” in other words, 
is not enough. Paralogical hyperbole is a conceptual tool for 
allowing individuals to “learn a way of experiencing rhetoric more 
consciously and intentionally” (Brummett, 1984, p. 104). With 
other public issues of science, such as vaccine skepticism or climate 
change, in which scientists are directly invited to construct “bio-
rhetorics,” rhetorics that use the “play of language” to move from 
what the science “is” to what one “ought” to believe about it, 
precision in dealing with how (and why) exaggeration exists 
between technical and public spheres in our arguments can only 
help us communicate responsibly (Lyne, 1990, 38). 
Copyright © 2016 Miles C. Coleman 
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